the Zealous

Many lawyers take a belt-and-suspenders approach to clauses that are intended to transfer copyright ownership from the developer-vendor to the customer with respect to the customer’s deliverables it is paying for, when representing the customer. “Let’s call it an assignment,” they say, and “let’s also call it a work for hire, just in case.”

The problem here is that in certain circumstances, it can be crucial to know with objective certainty whether copyright has been assigned, or whether ownership of it passed automatically via work-for-hire doctrine under applicable copyright law (such as the US Copyright Act’s definition of work made for hire in section 101).

From Charles Silver, A Private Law Defense of Zealous Representation, U. of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 638 (2020):

Moral philosophers object to the ethic of zeal, also known as the fiduciary duty and the principle of partisanship, because it requires lawyers to ignore any adverse effects that lawful actions beneficial for clients may have on third parties. For example, when representing a landlord, a lawyer may not refrain from evicting a tenant family that is behind on the rent for fear that the children will wind up on the street. Because harms inflicted on third parties normally bear on moral assessments, philosophers contend that lawyers who ignore them are amoral, immoral, or morally stunted.

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A recent US district court decision in a lawsuit brought by Facebook and Instagram carries important lessons for counsel in the drafting and negotiation of survival clauses—clauses that purport to extend the operative effect of contractual obligations beyond the termination or expiration of the relationship.

The case is Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Bright Data Ltd. (ND Cal 2024).

Meta Platforms, the owner of both sites, brought a breach of contract action against Bright Data, alleging that Bright Data violated online terms of service and use by scraping (anonymized) user data and selling access to analysis of it. The terms of both sites prohibit the collection of user data via automated means and the selling of such data.

In adjudicating cross motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the Facebook and Instagram terms do not prohibit logged off public data scraping even during periods when the scraper has an account. More importantly, scraping after termination of such accounts, the court ruled, was likewise not prohibited—despite the existence of a survival clause that purported to extend the applicability of the anti-scraping clauses beyond termination of the user’s accounts.